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ON OUR CASE-LAW OF CONTRACT:
OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE, !.*
By K. N. LLEWELLYNt
THE thesis of this paper is that the cases, and indeed most that has
been written when the cases were inznzediately before the case-trained
writer's eye, contain a rather coherent and workable and moderately simple
body of case-principle and even often of clean case-law about the forma-
tion of business agreements, at least in the matter of Offer and Accept-
ance. And the chief reason why this phase of the law of business
agreement continues unnecessarily obscure, and troublesome, and more
often unpredictable than Reason would allow, is that the sustained illum-
ination of point after point after point has been presented with a certain
almost desperate regularity as a series of minor qualifications of basic
theories and of a basic analysis which have not for a century or so
rested on either case-law or on sense, and yet have not been re-examined
in the light of their incessant and effective partial challenges. 'When the
qualifications needed to make a supposedly simple basic structure of
theory give accurate results in practice reach the point where the simplicity
is overwhelmed by its own qualifications, and when the qualifications are
not made to cohere in theory, though they do in meaning, then a fresh
start becomes over-due. The work has been done. The knowledge has
been gathered. The insights have been expressed. It is all in careful
print. It needs but to gather together and give voice to its common
meaning. This paper proposes to discuss some of the voicings in fie
light of themselves and their brethren, rather than to hide each of them
away from all of the others under a cloak of theory which perhaps
never should have been. In union lies here clarity as well as strength.
CASE LAW AND Coiox LAW
But certainly no man can write or think upon Our Case-Law of Con-
tract as in any sense a unit without doing violence to some cases or some
of the received categories, or both. And any disregard of decided cases
or of accepted categories as being unsound or misleading or to be slighted
*This paper, like its predecessor, The Rule of Law in Our Casc-Lazo of Contract
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1243, is inscribed to Arthur Linton Corbin, my father in the law.
tProfessor of Law, Columbia Law School.
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in favor of others forces attention to what it may be which we are dis-
cussing under the head of Our Case-Law of Contract.'
The cases divide;- what then is the "case-law" of Contract? Again,
five decisions in three States go one way, but in forty-five States there
has been no decision and a powerful dissent occurred in the most recent
case; what then is "our" case-law of Contract? Of again, if offer of a
reward by a government calls for no knowledge or intention to accept,
is that part of our case-law "of Contract"?
Holmes minted gold when he taught that the Common Law was no
brooding omnipresence in the skies; but, save so far as may specifically
concern one slender question of political and administrative wisdom-
namely whether federal courts which concede Massachusetts law to be
applicable are to dispute with the courts of Massachusetts what Massa-
chusetts law is-the minted gold would risk transmutation into counter-
feit if one were to add: "There is only the common law of New York
or Massachusetts." A "general common law of the United States" there
may not be; but a materially general common law in the United States
there is. It is not easy to lay hold of; partial insight has sometimes
exaggerated it into the Platonic omnipresence denied by Holmes; other
partial insight has acidly ignored our common law, asking for its authority,
or for "its" effect or nature in the case of conflict. 2 The sometimes ecto-
plasmic formlessness of our common law lends it over-easily to either
treatment. Present, however, the common law is; and in ways of its own
which are not mysterious, but only too familiar to be noticed accurately,
it moves, and moves effectively. It deserves attempts at further descrip-
tion. For as with the relation of rules to cases, our habit has been to
1. The best and most rounded discussion I have seen in print on what "our" com-
mon law is today is Pound's What is the Common Law? in the Harvard Tercentennial
THE FUTURE oF THE CommoM LAW (1937). As will appear, there are sonic differences
in emphasis and even of substance between us. But the care and balance with which
the paper has distinguished superstition about detailed things which "the common law"
has been supposed to consist in from the less tangible but for all that real and vital
things which do make up the essence of our common law are as welcome as they have
been rare.
2. The lines of the argument are familiar. At the one brute end, judges "cannot"
make law, and "principles" pervade the common law world of space and time. At the
other brute end, no man kno'ws the law of any case until the final court for that case
has refused rehearing. There is patently no joinder of issue; two such positions are
held in different worlds lacking even a rainbow bridge. Mediating positions move from
the one end through such patent truths as that logical premises for new decision are
always capable of development out of our materials or the expansion of sources to in-
clude changing mores or from the other end through perception of the psychological
effects of a held ideology or an established practice of movement close to patterns or the
importance of held norms even during departure from them. To be noted is that any
attempt to state the fact, to approach success, must get one foot in the world of ethical
norm, one in that of logic, one in that of judicial psychology, and one in the world of
how our society does practically go round.
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notice consciously only some one phase of the common law at any given
moment, and at that moment to over-notice it and overstate it; to ignore
the inconsistencies among our conscious noticings; and to leave the work-
ing reconciliation to our fingers rather than our pens.3 The working
reconciliation is indeed there. We make out in practice rather comfort-
ably with the decisions of our own State and those of other States, with
national texts and encyclopedias and digests and services and law schools
and with local judges, local jurisdiction, local rules.
Suppose we make a few of our accepted working practices articulate,
not one by one, but all together.
It seems now unlikely to challenge, even by the federal courts, that
the case-law of any jurisdiction so far as covered by decision in that
jurisdiction is to be accepted as authoritative for that jurisdiction.' As
to decision on any uncovered point which can be foreseen with any clarity,
one would argue the same; and many would so argue if some form of
words had come to be recited as "now well settled in this State." When-
ever the course of decision in any State departs from the general or
otherwise common course, however unique or wrongheaded the depar-
ture may appear, we have non-community of legal results within the
nation; so much is clear. So if there be family-wise departure (one or
more minority lines) to that extent "common law," whatever else it does
mean, does not mean like outcome of like cases. Wherever there is
"confusion," one must suspect the same.5
But it is no less fundamental that even the stock of legal concepts
and categories within the country which we use for ordering our thought
and for diagnosis of the legal nature of a situation is far from homo-
geneous. Some examples of peculiarities are familiar: community pro-
perty, the Louisiana "privilege", New England's strict foreclosure, the
Western miner's partnership, the original Pennsylvania bailment-lease, the
MTassachusetts trust. Equally familiar is the power of statute over non-
constitutional case-law, both in the single jurisdiction and where departure
is cumulative by jurisdictions rather than scattered. There is a marked
tendency for statutes to run in families, from codes of civil procedure
or Field codes through recording acts and New York statutory trusts
and the statute of frauds; more recently from workmen's compensation
acts and "uniform" commercial acts' and bulk sales acts on into fair
3. Compare the prior paper, (1938) 47 Y.ua L. J. 1244 if.
4. Compare the opening of the literary floodgates by Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304
U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938) ; Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47
YALE L. J. 1336; Corbin, The Common Law of the United States (193S) 47 YAM L. J.
1351.
5. But see infra, p. 17, ff.
6. Even the Negotiable Instruments Law is splotched with amendatory change
and addition, sometimes clerical in character, more often important. See B-uTEys Bmr;-
N-,'s N~omiABLE I2sTaNmt~Ts LAW (6th ed. 1938) 1-97 (amendments by section);
1127 (by State). Such statutes prepared and urged by particular interested groups as
1938]
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trade acts, little Wagner acts, and the recent mass of relatively uniform
state legislation under federal initiative. Any statute which effectively
innovates produces a departure not only from community of result but
from community of base-line. Families of statutes do initiate a new
semi-common base-line, and a new and partial case-law community of
"construction", gap-filling, new building of law upon the new statutory
base; statutes elaborate enough, or old enough to have been litigated into
elaboration, even shape new legal institutions in their own image: e.g.,
limitations, recording, attachment, survival of tort, remodelling of the
seal and its effects; but this new community is at the same time a dis-
ruption of any general community of legal result unless and until both
statute and its construction become uniform for the country or, as with
the federal tax system, can control the country.
It will not do to fool ourselves about this situation. What we have
in these forty-eight states is, in the main, neither common outcome of
cases, nor common detailed rules, nor even too great a stock of truly
common concepts and institutions, if we make the concepts and insti-
tutions precise enough to have direct decisive or even direct persuasive
bearing on the outcome of a case." It is not merely that discrepancies in
procedure mean discrepancies in the substantive effect of "substantive"
law. It is that for the lawyer's case the position and relation of twig
and leaf are more vital than the general concepts "tree", or "apple-
tree", or "Baldwin". Hence, even while national books and the reports
from across the line are open on our desks, we find it wise to get the
opinion of homegrown counsel on the point of law-this though it be
a point of purest case-law.8 Indeed the divergencies reach materially
further. Though we are likely to assume that at least our law
language and our general body of legal information are one, and that
our techniques of legal thinking and of work with legal tools are com-
those on "Bulk Sales" and "Fair Trade" have run in families within the family, and
require discussion according both to their "type" and to their individual shape of nose
in section 3. See MONTGOMERY, LAws AND DEcisIoNS APPLYING TO SALES IN BULIC
(2d ed. 1926).
7. I do not overlook the fact that a legal institution, like any other, can have a
flavor and a strain for development along some given line. But my observation is that
such flavor and strain are rarely strong enough, so to speak, to force a case-law result,
Given the right facts, and the right counsel, then yes. Otherwise, one must more often
wait through a period of groping and confusion and perhaps be thrown entirely off line
by mischance. Perhaps the answer is that where flavor and strain have come to almost
force a result, we look ahead, and see the result as already achieved.
8. This despite due attention to the counter-phenomenon: that of specialized busi-
ness counsel in a specialized field who can and often must give local counsel the theory
and material for a brief on some tricky point: compare the history of trust receipt
litigation. And despite due attention to the fact that local counsel may be needed for
other purposes than advice on the law. For neither of these things disturbs the basic
importance of the point of the text, but only gives it a non-exclusive importance.
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mon among lawyers and among States, closer observation affords some
not unreasonable grounds for checking up in detail before such an as-
sumption be merely indulged. For instance, in actual use and work,
what will a law review citation be worth as against an encyclopedia?
If there are separate chancellors and non-code pleading, does that
not affect the thinking techniques of the local bar and bench? Is there
a local preference for "foreign" citations from some particular juris-
diction? Has the bar at large grown up with Bispham's Equity, or
Pomeroy's, or Ames'? Is the merchant, the manufacturer or the farmer
the center of thinking about and sizing up transactions? Is the nicer
type of legal reasoning and the finer type of distinction a practice
or an irritant? As between individual lawyers, individual judges, so
between benches of judges and whole bars, and so between jurisdictions,
there are divergencies along such lines as these, and as between areas
where the same names of institutions or even the same institutions and
similar wording of rules may happen to be accepted. A few years of
work with such a body as the Conference on Uniform State Laws turns
up a degree of cross-purposing in communication and a diversity in legal
techniques between lawyers from different jurisdictions which no man
would suspect from reading our nationally sold texts. It is a cross-pur-
posing different in kind from that one meets between country and metro-
politan lawyer, or between good, mediocre and bad lawyer within a
single jurisdiction; it is a cross-purposing which lacks any single authori-
tative source--of rule, definition or method-from which to argue with
and toward agreement. And sometling is gained in clarity by the sharp-
ening shift in terms when, in thinking about how far we have in the
United States a common law, common concepts, common techniques, one
turns first for his data to the ca.se-law, the case-law concepts, the case-law
techniques of the several jurisdictions.
Yet when all this has been said, it but opens the picture of the common
law in these United States. That common law is in first instance ideo-
logical. It exists in good part and persists in greater part because we
think we have it.' Meantime the texts aforementioned, the encyclopedias,
the services, the Restatements, the law school case-books and the schools
themselves bear witness to the power of an idea to realize itself-in part.
To the taught tradition eloquently described in Pound's pages can be
added the learned tradition, the mere contagion of the assumption of a
common law." And decisions and writings pour from the various juris-
9. Insofar it somewhat resembles the orthodox doctrines of Offer and Acceptance.
But "the common law" differs from this particular part of it in that the more necessary
lines of escape from its ideology (the home-grown precedent, the local statute) have
become conscious and articulate, and their operation therefore more certain and pre-
dictable.
10. Together, of course, with the Icannzg of much detail of "precept" and practice--
of "habits of thought", points of view, accepted -alues-vhich can go on at need even
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dictions into a common reservoir from which any jurisdiction can pump
to meet a need its own decisions or dicta have not supplied; which, too,
provides power for the mill of scholarship.
This would be difficult if the idea of common law were not imple-
mented or had not implemented itself with some reasonable degree of
common vocabulary and common case-technique." Difficulties in com-
munication of legal thought between the gentlemen from Mississippi,
Washington, Minnesota and Massachusetts there are; but they iron out
with a tithe of the effort needed to iron out similar difficulties between
any of them and the gentlemen from France, Germany, Sweden-or even
England.12 German case-law, for instance, reminds an American of some
kind of platypus: it exists, and its race perpetuates itself, but it is queer
enough to make us feel "There can't be no such animal"; it has not
only fur but bill; it does suckle its young as ours does; but with a different
milk-and it lays them in a code-shell like an egg. Whereas "the com-
mon lawyer is at his worst when confronted with a legislative text"'13
in the teeth of conscious instruction. Indeed one line along which Pound's development
of Maitland's "tough law" and Ehrlich's "power of untrue doctrine to realize itself"
could reward still further development would be in detailed study of the cross-play when
the other influence he mentions, that of judge, advocate and counsellor, are at work
on correction of schoolmen's theory. In present day case-law, at least, we then have a
battle of a taught tradition against a learned tradition; for how to escape from taught
doctrine and shape both judgment and new doctrine to the living fact has not for some
generations been in the tradition of curricular instruction.
11. There is a fascinating study to be made on the process of this: the persistent
separation of vocabulary, for instance, as between common law in the narrow sense and
equity, even while equity develops or absorbs case-law techniques closely similar to those
on the strict common law side; the manner in which and degree to which the incursion
of statute may have driven the case-law branches together; the incursion of case-law
technique into administration, as distinct from the effect of the mere necessities of econ-
omy and internal policing-and the like. We know little about any of this which can
be regarded as documented, even over small areas. The most suggestive material is again
and as usual Max XVeber's Reclsso.'iologie, in WTSCuArr UND GESULLSCHAFT- (2d
ed. 1925). And compare GOEBEL, FELOxY AND MISDEMEANOR (1937) cc. IV, V; Malcolm
Mason's forthcoming book on the course of legal institutions in Tudor England.
12. What, for instance, is an American lawyer raised on modern Contract theory
and the Sales Act to do with a modern English lawyer to whom in Sales a "condition"
is as of course an "obligation," but one which, at least until acceptance of the goods,
is to be distinguished from a "warranty;" or with a Frenchman who, perceiving cc qu'i
doit, perceives no point at all in indicating the precise consequence if '!he" doesn't?
Whereas he can at once understand Waite's use of the terms [SALES (2d ed. 1938) 11 ff.]
because, aware of the diversity of usage, Waite explains at length and in advance what
his terms will mean and why.
13. Pound, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18. Stone's discussion in the same volume picks
up, as Landis and Radin have, the problem of developing the alternative available common
law attitudes. And it is fair to argue that these, while still not to be relied on, must be
gaining some ground, else statutory drafting in simpler, broader terms would neither
survive nor spread. "In the course of employment," even as later whittled by "out of,"
has received, for instance, a moderately sympathetic development by the courts, So have
the Wagner and Little Wagner Acts. And contrast the whittling of the bona fide
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unless it be when he attempts to build a sweeping abstraction or a system-
atic theoretical structure. Indeed a whole institution borrowed by us
outright from the Continent would be pinched by surrounding institu-
tions among which it would be thrust, would lack drive and comfort in
development (say comniandite, Grundschudd, the notarized contract);
whereas such adaptations of our own vague trust-concept as the trust
receipt and the Massachusetts trust, if once accepted in a new juris-
diction, have made themselves at once at home and settled in beside the
native legal fauna. The very fact-for it is a fact-that a case or even
a series of cases from another State cannot be really grasped by one who
lacks knowledge of the context of neighboring, interlocking rules and of
the procedure, only points the power of the common law idea; for we
use such cases, one by one or in groups, as if we understood them, and
their use affects our law. On the other hand, this looseness of use of out-
State precedents points up the essential looseness of the common law itself
and of its thinking methods: if the concepts did not lack sharpness, we
should be conscious of the need for accommodation of borrowed material
in regions beyond the immediate case in hand; if the techniques of our
own local case-law were not largely flexible, inconsistent among them-
selves, and too familiar in their inconsistency for notice, we should be
struck and estranged by opinions which varied from our own particular
cleanly perceived or consistently practiced line of teclnique-thus, if we
were distinction-men alone, we could not fail of revulsion at reasoning
from broad vague principle (however useful); if we were principle-men,
only, we could not stomach mere unreasoning reliance on the all-fours
case. Pound also has his finger on the pulse of law common to us when
he insists on the tremendous influence of our relational thinking-indeed
of our relational perceiving. Not only do we easily and comfortably think
in terms of Master and Servant, Landlord and Tenant, and the like;
which we do. But even where we have no such double headings of
thought, we give to our concepts single names which stand as units,
their feet in fact, their heads in legal consequence: agency, trust, contract,
offer, acceptance, suretyship. It is mistaken to conceive such (e.g., agency.
suretyship) as breaking in upon relational thinking: their effect is rela-
tional because it is situational; because the typically common-law fusion
and confusion of the law and fact sides of the single term forces in con-
stantly new legal color as the situation changes, and constantly shifting
application without the handicap of surmounting rigorous legal defi-
nition.'4 Meanwhile the reservoir of case and writing serves not merely
purchase purposes of the recording acts with the furthering treatment accorded to the
unclear more recent sections on negotiable documents of title.
14. The most striking case of this has been our double and parallel development c.
"private" "property," from the individual owner into "the" corporate "person,' and fr m
active possessory use-control-and-disposition into the modern complex with ue. ps-
session, control, return, and disposition not only largely separate but themselves further
1938]
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to irrigate our local parched lands, it serves to feed proposed uniform
statutes which, out of what is taken as common experience, provide a
given State at one step with fifty or five hundred essentially case-law
decisions. 5 It serves to check or re-orient or even remodel the rule of
many a State which finds itself out of line. It sells law books. It
finances its own perpetuation. It adds subtly to the feeling of the
oneness of a nation. Its very phases of non-commonness, set against its
own ideal, constitute a constant attack on personal and legal provincialism,
an invitation and challenge to awareness, comparison, critique. And truly
common to all of our States, though rarely mentioned, are aspects of
the work of those judges who (and the fact is no small part of our
partly common case-law system) still hold the ideological center of the
legal stage : the signed opinion; the open, signed special concurrence
or dissent ;17 that "feel" for fact in the cause in hand which means at once
a sensitivity and a groping-a feel derived only in part from our peculiar
received categories, our received lines of sizing up the legally significant
in a situation; a feel working often despite those categories: a case-law
feel for fact which is one of the most significant features of the law
system common to American jurisdictions. Along with it goes a notably
subdivided. But the quiet and unnoticed relational and situational shifting to which coin-
mon law terminology lends itself with such peculiar ease is built to bridge smaller gaps,
not industrial and financial revolutions. It does grateful work within its compass.
15. This aspect of a semi-codifying uniform law has been too often overlooked, Con-
sider the terrific waste which is prevented when each individual state no longer has to
work out for itself its attitude on purported sale of fungible goods. Whereas there have
been ....... jurisdictions busy with the public officer's disqualification to earn a
reward, a matter which half a dozen cases could have gotten moderately clear for all
of us.
16. The "rule of law," in any of its senses, is not peculiar to the common law; wit-
ness the very idea of Rechtsslaat, or the Continental jurists' insistence upon the legis-
lative rule even at times as dwarfing the judge. But the judge-in-the-center is a definite
part of our traditional thinking about law. A common lawyer, British or American,
thinks "judge" when he hears the word "law." Not only do our books not move in
terms of "the legislator," but, for instance, "administrative law" suggests to us Court
control of administration, not the administrative self-regulation, self-policing, "self"-re-
view out of which our own history has budded off a Court of the Exchequer, a Court of
Customs Appeals, a Board of Tax Appeals. And of course our own non-English brand
of "supremacy of law," judicial review, though no necessary consequence of the judge-
as-the-center, would yet be hard to conceive in a system in which the judge had not been
the very heart of thinking about law. Whatever the gain for jurisprudence in widen-
ing its scope to include non-judicial phases of control by state officials or others--and I
think that gain to be great-the working common law will not soon or willingly let go
this focussing of thought upon the judge. And no realistic c-,'se-lawyer would care to
see any widening of the scope of vision blur that focus. I have some difficulty in following
the emphasis and implications of Pound's treatment of the judge's position, Fmul, or
THE CommoN LAW 15 if, but none in following those in 1 LAW-A CENTURY OF PROGltnSS
(1937) 9, -ff.
17. For some beginnings toward study of the private law effects of these things,
see my PRAJUDIZIENRECHT (1933) §§ 42, 43, and On Warranty of Quality: 11 (1937)
37 COL. L. Rnv. 341.
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common aptitude for strongarming a needed result "out of" rules which
do not contain it; a veritable gift for pertinent logical fallacy 2 -- and a
notably common and often baffling failure to make explicit when strong-
arming or fallacy will be used, and when not. ht the vncasterc to which
the country's other-than-strictly legal institutions show common form and
common developmental strains, these last-mentioned factors in the courts
drive despite all strictly legal differences toward a semi-community of
result. But in the measure to which out-State ways of living and sizing
up are not our ways, these common legal factors push toward de-com-
munity of results at law-and so, under case-law, of rules and of insti-
tutions.19
In a word, while the legal language, the legal concepts, the loose use
of both, and a reservoir of rules (loosely phrased) and principles (vague
but appealing) might be thought to make up the common law in the
United States, these all together constitute mud less of it than is com-
fortable for any (if any there be) who may believe in law as consisting
merely of precepts or rules; and too close scrutiny of the actually ac-
cepted variant rules and wider precepts reduces somewhat sadly under
any such belief the area of the common law. Whereas certain phases
of legal institutions and their working, notably those which can be summed
up as "a case-law scheme of things" are truly common, because the very
divergencies among the particular case lav schemes are divergencies in
emphasis upon one or another of elements which are, for all that, common
to them all.
The common presence of the case-law ideal that doctrine must in the
long run square with the course of the decisions, coupled with the per-
sistence of the common law ideal of a universal or (at worst) a best and
widely prevailing doctrinal formulation of precise rule and guiding
principle, affords these papers on Our Case-Law of Contract an area
within which to work.
ON THE REQUISITES oF RuLEs
In the preceding paper it was noted' 0 that rules of case-law for judges
and rules of case-law for counsellors had no occasion to be the same;
18. For a superb collection of examples of judicial fallacy in logic, pertinent and
impertinent, see Treusch, The Syllogism, in HALL, RFADNs In JunsrI'ZNCE (193S)
539. My own view is that fallacy will remain an essential tednique in good judging
until the premises of judicial action become both more explicit and more fluid. EssAvs
ox RasF.c, Ix THE.SocaM SCMIEcES (Brookings, 1931) 89 ff. A practical art like
judging calls not only for creative imagination but at times for creative fallacy. Cf.
also Moanms, How LAwYans Tn x, and my review (1938) 51 HAn'. L. Rrv. 757.
19. Extremely illuminating here is Moore and Sussman, Debiting Direct Discounts
(1931) 40 YA. L. J. 381, 555, 752, 928, 1055, 1219. A minor effort over a longer time-
range is my own On Warranty of Quality (1936) 36 CoL L. REv. 699; (1937) 37 Co.. L.
REv. 341.
20. 47 YAI.a L. J. 1257 ff.
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that the counsellor's interest (the advocate's is different 21) centered in
prediction of what judges would do, so that in case of doubt he had no
rule, or at best one to be phrased in terms of variant likelihoods; whereas
any rule designed for judges in a case of unpredictable outcome could
be quite certain in form, the question being whether, with. authority
ambiguous and wisdom speculative, the judge would care to make his
own that particular certain rule, as against its competitive rule or rules
of equally decisive and certain formf2
Indeed the distinction could readily be carried further, so far as to
challenge the title of rules for counsellors to be called rules of law at
all; for such rules are not normative, they command nothing, they con-
tain no element of Oughtness, they do not even directly guide the cotu-
sellor's action in his counselling. They are of the nature of a weather
forecast: they state facts or probable or possible facts about future
judicial conduct in the light of which a counsellor proceeds to do his
counselling. Yet a good strong stream of usage regards such predictions
as "rules" of case-law2" and we have seen that past decision and language
21. The advocate begins with a conclusion and with a range of minor premise partly
forced on him by the facts or record and his adversary, partly and within limits set
by facts or record malleable. His first concern with rules is to find or frame one or more
which, if made to hold an available minor, will force his needed conclusion. His second
concern is to persuade the chosen rule of law into acceptance by the tribunal as tile
proper rule for the case, and then to persuade acceptance of some available minor as
fitting under that rule. The psychological process of argument often enough takes tile
form chiefly of making the conclusion appeal as desirable, and using the fact-argument
to sell the chosen rule; but that is nothing to our purpose here. Here it imports only to
note that the advocate resembles the judge in that he must weigh the competing rules
(latent or explicit), and in that in argument he deals with his chosen rule as being,
both certain in form, wise in result, and (typically) as already solidly established. He
differs from the judge in that his primary concern in selection among the competitors
is not to pick the wise rule nor the just one if he can, but to pick the one which will win
his cause: i.e., one which holds his case, his way, and inescapably; and which can be
made to appeal as either too settled to unsettle, or as too wise not to adopt. It is in
judging his range of possibility and safety and his line of persuasion that his view of
rules resembles the counsellor's somewhat; but his base-line is not "What will they
do ?"-a little abstractly about unknown future judges argued to by unknown future advo-
cates on unknown future facts of unknown flavor-but "what can this bench be got to
do?" Predictability and leeway are factors here sought for, but in terms of the per-
suasive or compelling power they may be made to yield. Thus, in the main, an accurate
grasp of the rules for counsellors and also of the rules for judges in a field suffices to
orient any advocate's thinking; but his further intensive exploration of the possibiliti,:
turns so much on the single bench and single cause as to move into art too individuated
and delicate for general writing on "a field" of law.
22. As will appear, I think many rules rather indeterminate in form to be extremely
useful for judges and even for counsellors, even in case of doubt: issue-pointing rules
which marshal the relevant factors around the vital criterion. But rules for judges call
always blossom into utter formal certainty.
23. Since Holmes the usage has grown; and so long as the two levels of thought
(what Ought to be decided under our legal scheme? versus what Will be, under that
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in a case-law scheme is indeed related with remarkable similarity to the
authoritative rule on the one hand and to future decision on the other,
the needs of the case in hand going far to determine both in the same
direction from among the malleable possibilities. So that it pays to retain
the same word to describe both kinds of "rule", so only the distinction
between them can be kept in mind. That distinction itself comes out
perhaps even more forcefully when one remembers that rules in the
proper sense always have as their office to guide action, and when one
then looks around for what in the counsellor's work corresponds in func-
tion to the rule of case-law for the judge. One finds the answer in those
rules for counselling which have so queerly and so long been relegated
to the manuals of office practice along with rules for office management
and for handling clients: rules which tell what to do, in the light of
what judges will do; as rules of case-law tell judges what to do with
the case in hand. Let each partner individually indorse the partnership
note; put the waiver of protest not on the back of the note but on the
face; guard the request in a guaranty as the apple of your eye--these
are in their own sphere rules as well settled as the presumption of con-
sideration in a negotiable instrument; settled, however, by experiment
and experience, not, save within a single law-office, by authority. This is
not the place to discuss such rules for counselling further, unless to repeat
amazement that whereas no medical book (where accumulated experience
with disease corresponds to accumulated experience with litigation, and
authoritative Nature to the authoritative court) would conceive of failing
to discuss and recommend procedures of diagnosis and treatment, the
law book which undertakes such valuable discussion is still a rarity. The
point here, however, is the divergence in function between the rule of
case-law for the counsellor and that for the judge, and by consequence
the likelihood of divergence in their content and their wording on the
same point.-4
Along the same line, principles of case-law serve wholly different func-
tions for these two interested groups of law-men, and must diverge hugely.
That very vagueness and breadth of principle for judges which can set
a judge free of narrower past decisions (as being "misapplication" or
neglect of the principle), and which even in a changing world can afford
same scheme?) are not confused, there is virtue in the appeal to utcome-especially in
case-law."
24. By the same token, a judge needs rules for multitudes of freak or silly cases
which a counsellor controlling the facts can skirt, and about which he ne ds to know ro
more than that there lie three miles of reef and shoal On the other hand, where action
simply has to be taken, and counselling requires the shaping of fact perhaps for litiga-
tion in an untried field such as emerges under Fair Trade Acts or Labor Relations Act..
the counsellor's lack of power to choose authoritatively when in doubt requires a pr -
cisien in his foretelling which courts can take a generation to work out in telling him.
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him a flexible and yet serviceably constant guidance ---that is for the
counsellor a warning that outcome will depend unpleasantly on what may
appear at the time and to the man to be the equities. The very principles
of case-law or for case-law which can be stars for judges' steering thus
turn for counsellors into little more than convenient devices for sorting
and pigeon-holing their knowledge of judicial reactions.
But rules of case-law for judges and rules of case-law for counsellors
do have one common attribute and requisite if they are to serve their
ends. They must be meaningful-a fifth attribute to be added to the
characteristics of the ideal rule of case-law already discussed ;21 a fifth
attribute which needs no less stress because it could in a first canvass
be assumed as implicit in the very concept of a "rule."
For if a formula is going to be a rule in the strict sense, that is, directly
to guide action, that formula must be understandable and clear about
what action it is which is to be guided, and how, and whither. It
must state clearly how to deal with cases on the raw facts as they arise.
I distrust the notion of attributes being "inherent" in any concept; but
this attribute comes close to being inherent in this concept. And it is not
waste of words to remind of this, for it also comes close to the essence
25. See Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1932)
46 HARv. L. REv. 1, 41: "There is another method of conducting government which
has proved more or less effective on occasions-that of striving to erect standards of con-
duct by which men may judge others' acts and their own. It may be doubted whether
any other method of achieving certainty in law is possible; indeed, whether there is any
other method of long maintaining anything which can properly be described as law at
all. In a society exposed to an unending stream of revolutionary inventions and sub-
jected to constant changes in economic structure . . ." Here is the case for Principle
in beauty, in conciseness; and I do not see that a realistic thinker can greatly quarrel
with its essence. To its essence any man's attempt to find a chunk of order, a touch
more of simplicity, must recur. Without quarreling, I yet urge to caution, both in spot-
ting the lines of principle, in phrasing it, in trusting it, and in expecting too much cer-
tainty to result from it. Quantity of appellate litigation is a good rough indicator that
results in such litigation are not easily foreseeable by the bar. The very appeal of the
multitude of cases Cardozo stamps "fore-doomed to affirmance without opinion" shows
in their multitude an uncertainty factor which all the other factors taken together cannot
wholly explain away. Compare in the light of this, within the one "field" of negotiable
paper (though I do think "it" to be at least four fields-payment-paper [checks], in-
terim credit paper [notes], scrambled short-term paper [short term collection drafts],
and investment paper) the fate of one principle, which we can symbolize as that of
bona fide purchase for value, and of another, which we can symbolize as proper diligence
to protect and notify conditional obligors. The b.f.p. principle is expressed in the N, I, L.
in rather broad language setting up standards. The diligence principle is expressed in a
multitude of detailed rules. The bulk of appellate litigation digested in BnmE.L'S BRAN-
xAN merely on the § 52 phase of the former (disregarding the greater bulk on e.g. the
"value" phase alone) exceeds the total bulk of digests on the diligence phase. I con.-
elude that, along with principle, rules have their realm of service. I am tempted to con-
clude that half or more of the appellate litigation about either has turned on faulty tailor-
ing of the word to the end. (Calculation based on 1932 ed.)
26. 47 YALE L. J. 1256.
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of accepted authority that its pronouncements go unchallenged, even
though their meaning be unclear or lacking: a formula once accepted as
"the rule" (or a theory or analysis once accepted as "the" theory or
analysis) of our authoritative law claims and gets repetition, whether it
prove meaningful or not in actual use. For there is in law as in magic
such a thing as "obligatory" ritual. And in law, as in magic, power is
attributed to repetition of the proper words, without inquiry into their
meaning.2 Indeed, I have wondered whether one main goal of Holmes
in inventing and overstating to prospective law yers2- his prediction for-
mula "what the courts will do in fact and nothing else" may not have been
to give young men new and fresh eyes for case-results as a means to
constructing case-closer and life-closer rules for courts' judging. In any
event, a "rule" for counsellors, as a predictive formula, is under no less
pressure to be meaningful as applied to emergent raw fact, or else be
useless.
Now accepted rules about our case-law which are utterly devoid of such
meaning are hard to find. Most so-called rules do indicate at least some-
thing about what facts they apply to, or something about some legal con-
sequence; and, mostly, something of both. But what needs note is that
until even the most precise' of expressions about legal consequence is
27. It is the peculiar glory of case-law that its own pre-suppositions carry the urge
and wherewithal for reform where this has happened. And contrary to the light 21ief
of most laymen when they happen to be in the phase of rebelling against legal techni-
cality instead of in the alternating phase of being impressed with legal form or legal
majesty, the law-folk show no peculiar tendency toward meaningless ritual. On the con-
trary, they have shown a peculiar and a peculiarly skilful guild-drive to work free of
such, and at worst to make rituals which were threatening to become meaningless take
over new, live meaning--on which, beside the story of the forms of action, set its modem
equal, the judicial rebuilding of our own Constitution. The difficulty for the law-folk
has been two-fold: first that the only systematically accumnilated tools of their trade
have been authoritative words; the counsellor's skill, the advocate's art, the judge's in-
tuition, all being left for random learning and more random.record. And, second, tile
difficulty has been that authoritative misguess in law, especially in judge's pronounce-
ment or writer's announcement, lacks the immediate and palpable demonstration of un-
wisdom which accompanies the misguess of a highly authoritative layman that no shoal
lies West by South, or that the price of wheat will soar within a month. The law-
folk, hampered as are no others by such ritual-inducing factors, have yet as a guild strug-
gled to conquer both with a persistence and wvith a degree of success which I count
one of the mighty achievements of the human spirit. But it was not when they were
resting on the oars.
For the development of similar ritual, its non-testing, and its possibilities of devel-
opment from within its own basic material, see Hamilton, Price-By W1'ay of Litigation:
(1938) 38 CoL L. REv. 1008, especially at 1023 ff.
28. The circumstances and motivation of THE PATH OF Tnc L,,w call for illumina-
tion. The point of view expressed on what is meant by law is foreshadowed a full quar-
ter-century before; but it is over-developed in 1897, and, as so over-developed, it is
out of harmony with much else in the work of a peculiarly integrated thintzer. He
never repeated it.
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guided to the facts which may emerge, the supposed rule can acquire no
meaning in life (as distinct from, say, a meaning in logic).
Take, for instance, in the Offer and Acceptance field, the too current
formulations on when, pending execution of an intended writing, the
expressions of agreement do, and when they do not, constitute offer and
acceptance. The Restatement, Section 26, says, in effect, that either may
be the case. This is true. Comment (a) says that it is very reasonable
that sometimes one should be the case, sometimes the other. This is also
true. Comment (b) says that you can also phrase the issue as one be-
tween a mere memorial and the exclusive operative consummation. And
this is true. Comment (c) says that even a memorial may operate to
change an agreement reached without it. True no less. But further,
deponent Restatement saith not. Result: the opinion can write (and often
does) in precisely the same language for any case on the problem, no
matter which way the case comes out, and almost no guidance is given
by "the settled rule" as to what to fill in on the one blank space: "In our
opinion this case falls clearly within the . . . branch of the rule." Yet
there is, and has been, good and shrewd judicial discussion of useful
criteria to use 2 ---persuasive, too, I suggest, to any court to which it
might be quoted-because it helps.
29. Perhaps most notably the serviceable homespun on what helps tell which branch
of the rule ought to apply, by Emery, J., in Mississippi and Dominion S. S. Co. v.
Swift, 86 Me. 248, 258-9, 29 At1. 1063, 1067 (1894) quoted by COSTIWAX, CASES O, Co,-
TRACTs (2d ed. 1932) 79, and GOBLE. CASES ON COxTRACTs (1937) 41. Williston's text
quotes it not; he has a different "test" [1 CONTRACTS (1936) § 28] which is either as
meaningless for actual adjudication or prediction as is the settled rule, or else is hor-
rendous; of which more in the second part hereof, for the difficulty goes to the whole
orthodox attack on Offer and Acceptance. Emery's language about how to know when
to use one branch of the rule and when the other is a rare type of judicial language in
these cases. Its non-quotation is either deliberate or is due to failure to see where sig-
nificance lies, for Williston's CASES ON CONTRACTS quote from the same opinion a run-
of-the-mine phrasing of "the rule" (1st ed. 1903, p. 19) (2d ed. 1922, p. 15). This though
Emery is no stylist, and none too surefooted on expressing exact meanings. What is
more, and worse, is that neither Corbin's first CASES OX CONTRACTS (1921) nor his
second (1933) quote Emery's real juice about, what Corbin would call "How to Know
Which Operative Facts the Case Presents," although both follow Williston in using
Emery's language as an extra statement of "the rule" and in citing oodles of cases hold-
ing each way without giving the result of analyzing their facts. I have located nothing
on the matter in Havighurst's COxRACTS CASES (1934) nor in Sharp's mimeographed
material (1938) ; each is occupied with other lines of development.
I submit that as to an important point, and one lying closer home to the practicing
lawyer than most points in Offer and Acceptance, the evidence is moderately persuasive
that the thorough acceptance of a sounding formula easy to roll on the tongue has drawn
off the attention of both good judges and good scholars from the fact that the formula
gave actually little light, and therefore only set the real problem for inquiry, Stronig
judges, conscious of their job, can make out even with such a formula: for it leaves
them complete leeway to do justice in the case. Weak judges, or stupid, one must pity
in the circumstance, as counsel hound them. Judges with bias might even disfavor the
production of a more adequate rule. The counsellor belongs as to this "rule" with the
weak or stupid judge; it gives him hold for neither hand nor foot.
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More frequent than such near-meaninglessness, both in the Offer and
Acceptance field and in Contract at large, is mnisguidance by an accepted
rule which has not been adequately worked over to determine the degree
(or direction) of its meaning. Non-guidance pcr se is vicious only passive-
ly, by leaving decision in confusion wile it sirens us from the hunt
for what might prove a significant and good rule for the problem-situa-
tion: Misguidance is worse; for by taking attention off the true issue,
it hampers the courts' appreciation of the facts; and by setting up not
only a false criterion but alleged authority that such is the only allow-
able criterion, it hampers intelligent judgment even when the facts drive
through into appreciation; and by often (and unpredictably) failing to
hamper, it produces needless uncertainty of result and turmoil of combat
and judgment; and by working out wisely part of tie time, it confuses
its own cure.
A touching example may be found in two old North Carolina cases.
In the first,"0 one gentleman had ordered carpets, by specification, from
But the lulled scholar has nothing to see here but a job undone. Any individual can
properly say: I have been busy elsewhere. But that the Restating team, hard working
and conscious of the need for care, muffed Emery's challenge (which Costigan had
seen and signalled) and that the two leaders (differently trained) both spotted and both
used Emery's opinion, but both without spotting and exploiting its contribution to the
only issue which could give living meaning to the sonorous "rule"-Ihat demonstrates
the lulling power in an accepted formula, however hollow.
For I repeat, in all of Offer and Acceptance, few "rules" or situations can possibly
be as practically important to the student whom scholars teach as this one. This is cune
of the few in which the future lawyer may hope to get a chance to shape the facts, not
merely to argue over the picked bones of their prior slaughter. Some lulling must inter-
vene, to keep this situation from peculiar and intensive study. Indeed, in the offing, as
Williston and Thompson remind us [1 Conm-%cTs (1936) § 28] is even the supervening
cloudbank of the "parol evidence rule."
30. Crook v. Cowan, 64 N. C. 743 (1870).
I make no apology for adducing two cases whose precise problems have since their
time been, both, pretty well solved, and so solved as to decently reconcile (I believe)
the consciences of these fighting judges. For the North Carolina judges were fighting
out a battle which will recur so long as case-law remains and as soon as it revives upan
this Earth: the four-cornered unrefereed dog-fight between the patent fact and decency
of each side (that makes two), the inadequate available respectable techniques wyhich
do not allow the true issue to be clearly either seen or seized, and the groping fear that
an over-use of such techniques to do rather decent justice today may give unforeseeable
trouble tomorrow. The two cases in one jurisdiction; the dubiousness of the first; the
sharp division passionately repeated; the overarguing by instinct first, though xthout
the proper technical tools; then by owvn precedent, or by own pride of position, or what?
-these are part of our case-law of tomorrow as of yesterday. Plenty of undreamed of
problems will they put their teeth into-with results like these of North Carolina, fol-
lowed by the spread of Langdell, followed by the dicta of Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass.
496, 37 N. E. 665, 42 Am. St. Rep. 437 (1894), followed, I hope, by more of the same
conflicting and progressing lines of both integrating and resilient thought. The great
stroke of Bishop v. Eaton, now canonized, [Rrs.%T-4z E.-r, Co:,"Mncrs (1932) § 56] wmas
but a dictum. But it made such lovely sense.
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another. The other did not reply, but put the goods in work, and shipped
them. On receipt of another, and telegraphic, inquiry, he again failed to
reply. He had already shipped the finished goods. The express company
then let the carpets lie at destination indefinitely, saying nothing. The
prospective buyer filled his needs elsewhere, and, when finally aware of
the situation, rejected the goods. Suit was for the price. The judges
had available only rules which did not touch what should have been the
issue: no contract without agreement; if a contract for sale, then delivery
earns the price. Hence the majority sensibly and eloquently found "agree-
ment" in the putting of the carpets in work, and then found delivery in
shipment. The dissent sensibly and eloquently found a buyer reason-
able who needed an answer, could not get one, and, after trying to get
an answer, bought elsewhere. But the dissent was further-having no
proper premise available--constrained to deny any efficacy to making the
carpets or even to shipping them; while the majority was for similar
reasons constrained to allow the price, despite what one can fairly call
the seller's repetitive and outrageous silence even after notice of trouble
at the other end. Lacking the concept of a condition constructed in proper
circumstances, that proper notice be given of an acceptance already accom-
plished by taking or beginning the invited action,3' neither majority nor
minority could handle both the situation of this case and that of its
successor32 where revocation occurred after the invited action of ship-
ment, which, had the goods not been destroyed, would reasonably have
resulted of itself in any needed notification.
Accepted "rules" of case-law may thus fail not only by untruth, as
when they say unambiguously to court or counsellor that a given out-
31. Phrased well for unilaterals, RESTATEMENT, § 56. The phrasing there, on these
very peculiar facts, might raise the question of whether this kind of express company's
receiving for transmission fairly makes notice unnecessary; but that is a question which
the explicit telegraphic inquiry ought to solve. For while § 56 is not drawn to cover
abnormal conditions in which the offeror gets no use out of what would ordinarily be
adequate means of knowing of acceptance and the offeree has no adequate means of
knowing of the offeror's lack in that respect-a supervening impossibility situation
erupting into Offer and Acceptance-yet the Section puts forward clearly a concept
which the courts under discussion simply did not have, a lovely issue-sharpener, and
puts forward also horse-sense criteria about its use. These give a line in, even when the
presuppositions of the Section may fail on either side.
32. Ober v. Smith, 78 N. C. 313 (1878).
With the difficulties facing the court in these two cases compare those raised when
an insurance risk has been officially approved, but the prospective insured has not been
notified. See Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Inmurance Policy (1919) 33 HARv. L.
REv. 198. When the suit is against the insured on a premium note the precise concept
needed is the one needed here. Indeed, considering that one of the two main things an
insured pays for is assurance against worry, and that he even has in furtherance there-
of a right to specifically procure delivery of a policy, then the case for insistence on a
condition of prompt notification becomes overwhelming. Why is § 56, then, so carefully
barred by its wording from application to acceptance by a promise? See Part IL
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come on the facts has been the course of decision (and therefore should
-or will-continue so) when such is not the fact; and that is the falsity
of rule to which the mind turns first.33 A number of "rules" about the
formation of unilaterals will be submitted in a later portion of this paper
as candidates to illustrate this. But a rule for judges may fail by un-
wisdom, in counselling as right a poor decision; this is peculiarly fre-
quent in a realm of ripened "conflict", or in any field, though the rule be
uniform, in which the real issue has not yet been diagnosed and articulated
-a matter immediately to be further discussed and clearly illustrated by
the North Carolina cases. Or rules may fail by meaninglessness, by using
words which say little or nothing about the outcome on the facts: so
when "the rule is certain" but there is no agreement anywhere "about
its application." This is the case of the simulacrum. False rule, bad rule,
and words which are not even a rule are alike in this: they e-vidcnce
doctrine which has either failed to study the fact-situation or has lost
touch with it. And a brief inspection of the genesis of case-lav doctrine in
puzzling situations goes far to make clear both how these diseases of
doctrine come upon us, and wherein lies their cure.
CONFUSION
The matter begins with three facts well-nigh inherent in our case-law
scheme. One-of which repetition is inevitable-is that courts do com-
monly study the facts and react to them and strive to find some way of
getting to a just result. One is that we require them, or they have come
to require themselves, not only to decide, but to lay down a rule for all
"like" cases. The third, that our judges, when in puzzlement, show the
well-known attribute of hoino sapiens in conscious honest thought: in the
main they do more wisely than they rationalize. (Which is why hard
cases often make bad law.) The doctrine of dictum, together with the
current disregard thereof at will, represent a perception of this last fact
caught into institutional form and utility, making available, easy and
correct at once the discard of bad guesses in past opinions and the capi-
talization of the good.3" (Which is why hard cases often make law better.)
33. The more I study case-law, the more important I think it to disentangle from
"wrong or false" rules for counsellors the good stuff which they hold. They are mostly
incautious and overwide generalizations. On the side of rules for judges, false rules are
more complex. They also need examination and disentanglement of the good stuff in
them; but this is a much harder job, because, in any case of doubt, you are likely to
find them to be an advocate's proposed rule (see note 21) which to you is "false" chiefly
because you do not like it. Still we do have purely false rules lying around. See infra.
34. "A good common law argument begins, and can often be very nearly ended,
by a penetrating exposition of the facts." Gardner, supra note 25, at 3.
35. I still hold, on this, to the position stated, on which rest the BnAr=t Busn
(1930), cf., e.g., 129; and my PR0JUDIZIEXRECT (1933), Cf., C.41., § 63. Over the long
haul our appellate judges have demonstrated that they do better wortk when their power
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Indeed, it is a commonplace for lawyers that the reasoning in the case
of first impression is a tricky thing. Strewn here and yonder are the
marvels, the prophetic masterpieces of our law, in which a whole new
legal situation was grasped at its first emergence, and shaped for the
decades or the centuries, to follow. Yet even there, the lawyer walks
softly, for only later decision tests the fairest-seeming prophecy."" And
the run of first impression opinions show sad need of re-working, and
they mostly get it. (Else bad law will indeed make hard cases.) On the
other hand, as one puts together first impression cases which he remembers
or rereads, what percentage of them were, as cases, unwisely decided?a7
This is what commentators on the unruly case of first impression tend
to pass by. Add, then, especially out of that nineteenth century when
the ways of the English judges (at least in commercial cases) bore real
resemblance to our current judicial practices, add the recurrent English
agreement on outcome, buttressed by two to four divergent lines of
emphasis or even of premise for decision. What does this mean, save an
agreement on doing, accompanied by experiment in telling why and
whither? The English instances attest the groping character of the rule-
making; as do ours in lesser measure. But even in ours, our relative
satisfaction with the bulk of actual individual results attest that the decid-
ing had a touch more sure than did the reasoning.
is seen as wider, and as a job for conscious responsible choice, than when it is seen as
narrower or non-existent and done in the dark. See Corbin, The Law and the Jwdyes,
3 YALE REVIEW 234 (1914); and most recently, Thc Common Law of the United States
(1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1351.
36. As illustrations: Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burr. 1663 (K. B. 1765), whose es-
sence on letters of credit took a century and a half to reestablish, whose essence on accept-
ance dehors the instrument is still troubled, and whose possible bearings on other standard
written engagements of business men ("firm offers" and the like) still grope toward
recognition. Or the Slaughter-House cases, 16 Vall. 36 (U. S. 1873), whose doctrine
played like a pendulum starting high, for a generation, and swung the other way for two
generations, and may be swinging back. Or another of Mansfield's, Heylyn v. Adams'zi,
2 Burr. 669 (K. B. 1758), whose careful qualification of the indorser's freedom from
liability for failure of diligence was repeatedly conditioned on supervening insolvency
of the expected payor-a vital condition later sloughed off by uncommercial judges, re-
developed, for checks alone, when deposit banking came in, and then frozen by the
Negotiable Instruments Law in this halfway condition-modified only by rules of waiver
after the event which make orthodox theories of consideration go green at the gills.
37. Adams v. Lindsell, 1 B. & Aid. 681 (K. B. 1818), for one. See RESTATamET,
CONTRACrS (1932) § 51. Crook v. Cowan. 64 N. C. 743 (1870), cited supra note 30, for
another. Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines 48 (N. Y. 1804) for a third-but there the court
thought itself bound by authority. Judged as of the time, place, and circumstances, Pin-
nel's Case, 5 Coke 117a (C. P. 1602), came out in proper fashion, so far as one can
see, as far as one can see, as did Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Ex.
1603), for all their aftermath of travail. Even Littlejohn v. Shaw, 159 N. Y. 188, 53
N. E. 810 (1899) was sound on its facts and issue. Each man must think in the fields
in which he has read widely; in mine, the first impression cases have worked out well
as between the litigants. Talk with men from other fields shows them concurring.
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Yet a developed legal structure, hydra-headed in personnel and dealing
with the long-range interaction of kaleidoscopic interests, cannot rest con-
tent with mere case-judgment. Rules must be framed to hold the whole
together. Rules must be framed to hold up-and hold down-judges
who are not supermen. Rules must be framed to guide long-range trans-
actions in advance. 8 The search is for significance in their framing, and
for accurate admeasurement of their proper scope (and, where they can-
not be counted on for precision, for tailoring them toward fairness in
any circumstance). "Confusion," whether among the cases of a single
jurisdiction or among all the cases, exists as long as either the situation
is described differently by different courts, or diverse criteria for decision
are announced. "Confusion," like "conflict," is in our current usage a
term referring to articulated doctrine, not to the course of actual decision.
Actual decision may run one way only, and yet leave behind what we
know as "confusion." For instance, when Hershey in 1917 discussed
bankers' credits, he exposed and illuminated a problem, and suggested a
brilliant solution, in a way which resembles a case of first impression in
the finest judicial hands.39 When McCurdy in 1922 then classified seven
38. The exact degree and incidence of this need is not dear. I have attempted to
raise a number of questions about it. W1hat Price Contract? (1931) 40 Y,%LE L. J. 704.
And in the particular field of Offer and Acceptance, it is a matter of relatively minor
moment, because in the great bulk of transactions not carefully held unclosed until the
final papers are signed, men do not know rules or consult lawyers, but go ahead and
then (in the cases threatening litigation) change their minds or become dissatisfied with
results, and consult a lawyer only to see whether he can-under the rules--get them
out. That is: they are not much guided in their "operative" action by the rules.
But even if this be true beyond its cautious statement, Offer and Acceptance Law is
a part of Contract Law. And Contract Law has phases-metropolitan real estate, 12-
month supply contracts, indenture-issues, big construction deals, intricate partnership
agreements, organized baseball, national marketing set-ups, etc., etc.-in which fore-
ward consultation, planning, and drafting become vital. And our ideology of Contract
Law is that "It" is one for A and B and any of the deals of any A and any B. By
necessary psychological contagion (and really explaining the contagion will give either
a Freudian, a behaviorist, or a gestaltist psychologist a nervous breakdown, though each
has something to contribute to an explanation)-by necessary contagion, even situations
or whole portions of the Contract field in which advance knowledge uf the negotiators
about the law is both unnecessary and absent in fact will nonetheless be affected by the
held ideology that rules must be framed to guide transactions hi adt'aice. For that is
the kind of ideology which seeps through even the intuitive bulkheads erected by sense
for the more concrete situation. It is not one of the Sunday School variety of ideologies,
itself bulk-headed in advance from the working practice of the six days. It is, in its lim-
ited sphere, the emotionally charged and penetrating kind of ideology for judges and
lawyers which for laymen as laymen grows up around such almost terrifically dynamic
ideas as Flag, Constitution, White Man, Business, Faith, Science, Practical, Mother,
Crime. It is therefore to be reckoned with as alhays one present factor, w:hatever other
factors may be present.
39. Hershey, Letters of Credit (1918) 32 HtAv. L. REv. 1. Be it noted that Hershey
was two years ahead of even the market collapse which began to produce the cases.
He was also, and even more so, in advance of theory, and bold to put and make clear
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diverse theories which had been advanced to uphold the "irrevocable"
banker's credit, he described "confusion", and sought for a "true" single
articulate rationale to clear that confusion up.40 The course of decision
had meanwhile become plain: once relied on, the promise was effective,
though with some divergence as to the extent of the remedy, and with
the intricate relations between the credit and the underlying commercial or
banking transaction still to be explored; and the case of attempted revo-
cation before any reliance at all (to which certain divergences of theory
might become crucial) had never been presented. 41 But the really awkward
a vital problem, and to wrestle with its solution. This, mit Verlaub, is case-law scholar-
ship, indeed. And by a practicing lawyer.
If a young man were permitted a backward glance at American legal scholarship,
that glance would have to do with the degree to which Hershey's challenge, care, and
dispassionate workmanship have over twenty years come to be increasingly the standard,
and the standard conscientiously striven for, in the contributions of the practicing lawyer
to the Journals. Even a young man can remember a time when a manuscript submitted
on law office stationery was more likely to be a sloppy two-hour revision of none too
good a brief. And can observe that today the professional scholar does well to button
back his ears when the thoughtful and informed practitioner takes time for scholarship.
On the other hand, the effect of the so-called "main purpose" rule under the Statute
of Frauds is as to doctrine in utter confusion. But the results, as I hope to show
later, are not.
40. McCurdy, Commercial Letters of Credit (1922) 35 HAIv. L. REv. 539 (seven
theories) ; The Right of the Beneficiary Under A Commercial Letter of Credit (1924)
37 HARV. L. REV. 323.
41. See FiNxELsTmN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMVERCIAL LETaRS or CREDIT (1930);
Neidle and Bishop, Commercial Letters of Credit: Effect of Suspension of Issuing Bank
(1932) 32 CoL. L. REv. 1.
Amusingly enough, when attempted revocation without prior reliance was presented,
it came without the label "Letter of Credit", and was drawn into a wholly different
orbit of influence, that of "Trust", instead of "Contract". This paper is not on foreign
banking, nor on Trusts, but the circumstance deserves note because it shows the vitality
of legal ideology, and of what label calls forth an ideology, to shift the incidence of
pressure of fact; and because it suggests the role counsel plays in spotting possibilities
and urging this label or that.
There are transactions in banking, peculiarly frequent in international banking, which,
stripped to essence, come to this: London Bank requests New York Bank to pay on
Jones' request (with or without conditions) because Smith has arranged that with the
London Bank; and will New York Bank please advise and pay, and London Bank
will cover. Now when this set-up hit our courts in terms of the question: Can New York
Bank, after promising Jones, and his reliance, revoke-and after the promise had been
put in the form of a normally handsome document on check-paper headed "Letter of
Credit"--it was seen as a new variety of Contract. But when the same set-up hit the
courts in terms of Smith's arrangement with London Bank: charge my account (or take
this payment), and tell New York Bank to pay to Jones' order, and advise him-then it
looked like Trust. (God save the res!) I personally think the matter, on the Oughts,
one to be worked out in terms of a combination of banking necessities and the under-
lying transaction, so that I am disinterested in either theory, as being "a" sound solution.
But it is, for purposes of this paper, exciting to see how in the one case the commanding
communication has fought down all supposed objections out of consideration theory; and
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confusion of result which attends the "clear" doctrine on Conditional
Acceptance42 is not felt as "confusion." Neither is the almost amusing
discrepancy between the "clear" doctrine on formation of the "true"
unilateral and the cases.4" To such matters we must recur, on the point
of curative procedures; here they serve to stress that the term "con-
fusion" refers currently to a failure of agreement upon articulation of a
problem or of a rule.
The next point is obvious: confusion of doctrine cannot rest indefi-
nitely confused. Sooner or later, some definition (or various definitions)
of "the" situation acquires currency. Some judge or counsel has a flash
of insight-good or bad-and his idea takes hold." The old familiar
Cooke v. Oxley presents all the elements of confusion happily compressed
into a single case.4" The declaration set out what would today be seen
as an offer open till four, and then accepted. But neither counsel nor
court had then available any concept of a continihg offer. Face to face
dealing was still the picture, with deals closed or else nugatory before
the speakers parted. The pleader therefore goes on to set out further
an offer and acceptance of present sale upon condition, the condition being
a further notice by the plaintiff of his agreement before four: This
meets the ideological requirement of some present and immediate agree-
ment. The court cuts through it, not for lack of agreement, but for lack
of a consideration. What happened at four o'clock Buler sees as one-
sided, and so no agreement; but to get out of the argument that the nine
o'clock deal was a complete sale "from the time when the condition was
complied with", Buller is forced to hurdle the pleadings and strongarm
how, in the other case, the whole problem of communication and promise drops out of
sight, and results turn instead on what (despite all known realities about what Smith
really "gives" the bank) the originating arrangement looks like "Trust"-in the "eye of
the law." It is also fragrant to observe that Hershey, who understood his banking, saw
and tried to use both ends at once.
42. Developed in Part II.
43. Developed in Part II.
44. Hamilton, in Pricc-By Way of Litigation (1938) 38 CoL. L. Rz'. 1003, points
in note 24, p. 1017, and on p. 1018, by indirection, at the role of counsel, moving into
the role of judges, for one possible once, inside the same sldns. Suppose his suggestion
to be wholly accurate, it would be but nice theater driving home a point which does not
turn on identities of person. In all our case-law, what with the conjunction of case-
profusion with hydra-headed case-law doctrinal technique, the advocate's profession
must be creative, and the mainly creative factor, and the judges must be largely mediating
and selective. A Holmes, deciding on grounds adduced by neither counsel, or a Mansfield,
using the case in hand as a springboard for regulating a whole institution: these stand
out because of rarity.
45. 3 T. R. 653 (K. B. 1790). The most extravagant display I have yet met of
existing confusion of doctrine in the face of clear fact, as also of exhaustive legal ingenuity
in testing every line conceived by a fertile advocate's imagination, is the first case on
fictitious payee, finet v. Gibson, 3 T. R. 481 (K. B. 1789). The court cut through to
factual need.
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into the facts the defendant's four o'clock agreement as being part of a
condition which had been pleaded as consisting only in notice by the
plaintiff. Now turn this face-to-face pattern of thinking loose upon a
deal by correspondence, where the presupposition of any possible face
to face agreement simply fails, and anything can happen." As we know,
almost anything has. Massachusetts set up a standard picture of a revoc-
able continuing offer with attempted acceptance binding only on receipt,
the detailed qualifications of which have never been worked out. Our
generally accepted standard picture is revocable continuing offer with
acceptance binding when mailed, painfully developed through a mass of
groping rationale to overwhelm most suggested qualifications (the wholly
lost letter, the overhauling countermand, the letter recalled before delivery
-but contrast the insurance cases re time of obligating the acceptor,
and the obligation-through-action cases re revocability.) The Germans,
from a thoroughly similar base-line, moved into a standard picture of
irrevocable offer plus acceptance binding only on receipt, which also has
needed its exploration of qualifications in detail.4 All were forced into
some type of rationale over three-quarters of a century before details of
implication could be settled. The Germans set up a standard picture of
an irrevocable offer with the letter of acceptance operating only if received.
The only given certainty was that when deals got to being made by cor-
respondence, the doctrine and ideology of face-to-face dealing would have
to sprout some new shoot to meet the situation in which the old double-
ended concept of "communication" had to split into a "communication
begun" which was not and could not be for a while a "communication
received". Neither was there any need for the choice made in Adans v.
Lindsell to develop as it did. Had a lost accepting letter been presented
in the next case, or the withdrawal power under the United States Postal
Regulations been exercised early, either, say, in conjunction with an offer
not made by mail, but taken away for consideration, it is an even chance
or better than our law on the point would have developed refinements
which it has not. It would not matter. For if the doctrinal definition of
a situation, when achieved, and however achieved, is adequate to grasp
46. For instance, Patterson's discussion, supra note 32, at 211 ff., simply cannot
be wiggled out of: "this coexistence in point of time . . . is utterly unattainable in
the case of contracts inter absentes". Add: what we have to think of as contract not
only occurs, but keeps occurring as of course, iter absentes. Doctrine has to meet fact
grown inexorable.
47. See Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-
Acceptance Doctrine (1936) 36 Coi. L. REv. 920. Nussbaum has given us notable
illumination, in setting the successively emerging official rules against their background
of legal philosophy, and of the other rules of the time in the system in question. But
what one may hope he will add to his discussion is an equally keen study of the detailed
case-troubles which each line of ruling has elicited, and of the answers reached-and
of the degree to which those answers do or do not converge.
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the situation in life without outrageous inconvenience, we can make out
with it. So only the doctrine be intelligible.
For men's dealings are not built in terms of recourse to law so much
as lawyers tend to think.4" It is even at times startling to consider the
degree of inconvenience, expense, hindrance, delay, miscarriage of inten-
tion, which laymen will stand for from the law, where the law impinges
only occasionally or where the practice of using counsel is established.4
Against that is to set the courts' dissatisfaction with results which bother:
which, together with counsel's ingenuity in making sane results seem
doctrinally plausible, is the mainspring of case-law readjustment.
'Where the doctrinal definition of the situation, when achieved, is too
greatly inadequate, then if the situation is of frequent recurrence in
appellate dispute one of two results is well-nigh inevitable. The one is
the development of "conflict". The other is covert confusion of result.
The third major possibility: wooden, persistent grinding out of injustice,
occurs and will occur again ;"O but it is not a dominant characteristic of
our courts even when fighting to clear decks of a top-heavy docket.
Covert confusion of result has been mentioned. It means that courts'
reactions to facts are at work at odds with their reactions to accepted
doctrine, reaching results which are unpredictable. It is present doctrine,
for instance, that offers without consideration do not stand against revo-
cation, and that the receipt of agreed consideration may be inquired into.
A recited dollar, unreceived, either will or will not make a land option
stick; and I do not think the cases classify by states, nor by whether
"[L.s.]" is on the paper, nor wholly by whether the deal is a concealed
48. And Mentchikoff notes here that some of my own writing on printed "form-
contracts" may well require revision. I suggest, for further study that printed forms may
prove to have at least three divergent lines of origin and drive: (1) internal administration,
ease of policing, and cheapening of operation (merchandising to consumer or retailer) ;
(2) standardization of competition (with almost inevitable drive toward shifting of the
standardizers' risks-realty operators' standard forms) ; and (3) setting the bacl:grciund
for quick action under understood and balanced conditions (bought and sold notes on
an exchange). At least, these; and with need for further study.
49. See On Warranty of Quality: H (1937) 37 COL. L. Ru. 341; and contrast the
specialized statute-drafting and statute-urging which particular counsel do from time
to time.
50. Pound's Mechanical Jurispndence (1908) 8 CoL. L. REv. 05 has not been
bettered for portrayal of this or for its critique. Yet thirty years, and Cardozo, have
intervened. And Cardozo's intervention left marks especially on that phase of law in
which the State's influence is less directly felt. A second edition of the 1903 paper,
with particular attention to torts, contracts, trusts, and the like, would rest on newer
fact which would make the earlier critique appear prophetic. I do not like Pound's
over-mechanical "stages" of law. But no man can fail to see a difference in judicial
attitude between 1898 and 1938, in "private" law cases. And Pound's phrasing in terms
of stages has come close to both foreseeing this, and getting at its dynamics. The phrasing
is bad history, and it is worse sociology, but it has for all that an essential and even
distinguished juridical rightness.
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brokerage, nor by whether the price seems fair and the deal honest in
the option-holder; though a study along all these lines at once might
make some sense out of what seems on first gathering of the cases to be a
welter. One thing, however, seems sure, and that is that the jurisdiction
which has flatly held the recital of the dollar in a land option for a fair
price to be conclusive cannot be relied on to rule the same way ol a
recited consideration in a non-negotiable note, nor where gold has been
struck during the life of the option, nor where the recited and unpaid
dollar is the alleged price of release for an injury which then turns out
to be really troublesome. In a word, we do not know where we are at.
Again, it is present orthodox doctrine that a correspondence is to be
atomized, and examined letter by letter from the beginning, each docu-
ment being preliminary, or offer, or rejection, or counteroffer, or what
have you, and exerting its full legal impact as of its own moment in the
sun. But what lawyer, save after study of the personnel of a given bench
at a given time, and of his own case on its net facts, will undertake to
predict whether a court will not go to bat on a correspondence only after
looking it all through first, and wind up with "In the light of the whole
and the action of the parties we think there was clearly a contract. If
the plaintiff's letter of May 21 was not an acceptance, the beginning of
the work in June and defendants' letter of July 7 at all events show that
an understanding had been reached. It is argued that the letter of July 7
did not meet the letter of May 21 in terms, and this may be true; and,
further that any offer the letter of May 21 might contain had lapsed.
But this suggestion appears in the defendants' letters only in August after
the market had broken," etc. So long as the cases will not go a single
road in their attack on such a problem, the outcome of new cases lies in
covert confusion. And covert confusion is a certain sign that something
about the doctrine covering it is wrong. The tool for guiding decision
and for predicting decision is not yet adequate. The situation needs
redefinition.
CONFLICT
No less does it, typically, if the road taken out of confusion has been
that into explicit conflict of doctrine.
Two types of conflict are somewhat similar in nature and result, yet
different enough to warrant notice. In the immediately familiar type, the
conflict lies not in defining the situation, but in the rules about what to
do with it: can a defaulting builder recover his net contribution in quantum
meruit? In the more interesting type the conflict lies in definition of the
problem situation itself. Rewards are either a matter of rewards or they
are a matter of contract-with perhaps a whole series of conclusions to
be derived or worked out from the categorization. A warranty of goods
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is a collateral contract or it is part of the sales contract. A "compen-
sated surety" is a professional insurer or "he" is a darling of equity.
More frequently than not, such differences in definition have to do with
whether to include some situation, seen as a unit at least for problem
purposes, in the sphere of some established body of law already gathered
under an articulate concept; the alternative being to mark it off for
peculiar treatment. Sometimes the peculiar treatment may be conceded,
and inclusion under the broader concept will then threaten "the" doctrine
there: if a parol gift of land is really an unexecuted enforced promise,
and an unexecuted enforced promise is really a contract, then what about
"the" doctrine of consideration "in contracts"? Such a conflict reminds
one of the struggle of an immunity against Crown law, or of a State
against some assertion of Federal legal power. The separatist urges reason
for diversity and lack of warrant for any claim to uniform jurisdiction,
rule and outcome. The argument is from history in the cases (as with
parol gifts) or from needed shift in policy (as with the "compensated"
professional surety company.) And the general problem presented lies at
the heart of any attempted synthesis of our case-law of Contract, the
cases indicating among other things that a deal more of home-rule prevails
in fact in portions of the field than it has been orthodox doctrine's fashion
to concede.
But it is when a situation as a perceived unit stands cleanly on its
own for definition that the nature of the whole conflict problem is carved
into sharpest relief, as is the normally wise road out. Let me recall the
old question of whether "a bill of lading" (meaning any honest shipping
document, not just some particular one in hand) was "merely equivalent
to the goods" or was a "quasi-negotiable document"!;' It is indubitable
that the approach to a shipping document as "merely representing the
goods" fitted cleanly into that open credit railroad shipment which we
have since learned to mark off as being "straight"; if anything, the
so-called common law theory tended to give too much verbal credit to
such a "bill of lading", so far as concerns transfer .of possession, for the
carrier had both privilege and practice of delivering the goods to the
named consignee without inquiry. On the other hand, overseas ship-
ments ran regularly to "order or assigns"; the bill of lading was in prac-
tice taken up before the goods would be turned over; it was in practice
frequently drawn against and the draft discounted; the bill of lading was
therefore currently taken as adequate evidence of full control and power
to dispose. The solution lay in observing that "the situation" was in fact
two situations, factually distinct, different in need. The British, whose
lay language had not fallen into the practice of naming railroad shipping
51. Initial canvassing of this material in my CASES Ax MATEIuiALS o- Sx.s (1930) ;
detailed development in my Ptirchase for Value and tMe Course of Trade (to appear).
1938)
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
receipts "bills of lading", 2 escaped our word-induced and useless con-
flict of legal doctrine. We ourselves emerged from it by readjusting our
definition of "the" situation in terms of the divergent situations-in-life,
and discovering a criterion for significant subdivision of what had broadly
and blindly been regarded as a single unit-type.
Problem and method are clear: Conflict gives rise to suspicion that
each view may have something in it, and that neither is wholly just to
such wisdom as lies in the other. The situation-types in question are
subjected to re-study, with an eye to .why some cases should have gone
(and should again go) one way and some another. We emerge with a.
discrimination which has been often felt, sometimes (in neglected cases)
perhaps even articulated, at least foreshadowed. Now it becomes con-
scious, and we tailor new rules based on new differentiation: two types
of bill of lading, each just to its own purposes, each available to any
user, de-confused and freed of a conflict in doctrine which itself rested
on a confusion of fact.
Indeed, whether conflict is achieved slowly qs a second stage to which
confusion is a first or bursts out suddenly and fullblown, one who follows
the story of conflict of rule or of situation-diagnosis can hardly help but
be struck by the degree to which the earlier cases which articulate the
conflict, like the cases at first impression, are well decided on the facts in
hand."3 Typically each of the opposing rules is wise enough as applied
to the group of situations in the mind of the court which announces it.
52. "An official detailed receipt given by the master of a vessel to the person cvil-
signing goods, by which he makes himself responsible for their safe delivery to the
consignee." Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1933).
53. In the warranty field, see my On Warranty of Quality, esp. II, supra note 19,
On the election problem in conditional sales, see Comments, The Sellers Remedies in
Conditional Sales in Massachusetts-A Study in Case Law (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rev. 960
and same "in California and in Mississippi" (1929) 29 CoL. L. Rav. 1123. On buyer's
waiver by failing to specify, see Eno, Price Movement and Unstated Objections to
Defective Performance of Sales Contracts (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 782. On the effect of
taking a bill of lading to seller's order, see Comment, Significance of the Concept "Title"
where the Seller Retains the Bill of Lading to Goods (1929) 29 COL. L. REV. 1100. On
the "passing of title" by misshipment referable to the contract, see my Through Title
to Contract, 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rav. 159 (1938). The problem leading to Sales Act,
§ 49 is of the same nature and history. See 'WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 484 ff.
Related is the history of the election doctrine in buyer's remedy. Comment, Buyer's
Election of Remedies Under the Sales Act (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 888. Or the divergence
in contract doctrine on the point of Ayer v. Western Union, 79 Me. 493, 10 At. 495
(1887), which bides essentially an effort to get the risk shifted to the delinquent tele-
graph company. Comment, Telegraphic Mishap in Business Transactions (1937) 37
COL. L. REv. 980. Closely similar is the problem of mutuality at law where its require-
ment defies orthodox consideration doctrine Comment (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 830.
And square on the point is the pre-existing duty rule, as between contracting parties,
with hardship-readjustment still doctrinally undifferentiated from hold-up; as is the
quarrel over whether "waiver" changes contractual obligation. Of current amusement
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Again and again the early opinions show the judge cautious in marking
out the factual limits of the case before him, in indicating why, for the
case in hand, his rule is excellent policy-only to have later writer, counsel
or court slough off the needed qualification. 4 A further observation can
be made: as the conflicting rules, now known as such, enter on their
rivalry for favor, new courts have often tended strongly to choose between
them in terms of the case in hand at the moment of choice. Rigidifica-
tion into mechanical slapping of the majority rule or even of the juris-
diction's prior choosing upon a case it does not fit, is a phenomenon of
what might almost be called the "maturity" of conflict.
In consequence, any resolution of conflict is unlikely to be wise which
simply prefers the one rule over the other. Occasionally, conflict does
signal merely persistent unwisdom in one group of courts." Much more
frequently, it signals a situation too broadly defined, a factual criterion
or a number of such which have been felt and responded to, in the case-
decisions, but which have not yet found voice and words. Conflict, like
confusion in either doctrine or result, and like doctrine false to cases,
warns to reexamination of the situation-in-life. 0
value is the soundness of Kent's decision and of Story's, in the cases which lead through
Swift v. Tyson to the Tompkins case.
54. Cardozo's insight here has already been quoted. Take Kent's "course of trade"
when Coddington v. Bay, 5 Johns. Ch. 54 (N. Y. Ch. 1821) went up to his own Court of
Errors and Appeals, 20 Johns. 637 (N. Y. 1822).
Mansfield's supervening insolvency of the proper party to pay, in Heylyn v. Adamson,
2 Burr. 669 (K. B. 1758) and one might almost add Cardozo's own muffing in the
Palsgraff case, of the essential line of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382,
111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
55. I think this plain, on the rule of the Sales Act, § 6 (2). The English rule simply
does not have sense; and that was made moderately clear by Holmes in 1872. Grain
Elevators: 0; the Title to Grain in Public Warehouses (1872) 6 A-..L. Rsv. 450.'
I think it moderately plain, on the point of Sales Act, §69(2), which made the wrong
choice; and moderately plain on the omission from the Sales Act of the English rule
on measurement, which the English have whittled to the point of showing obvious regret
at having it around to need whittling. I think it moderately plain that the requirement
that an offer for reward be known, to be acceptable, is simply silly. But I doubt not
some of my judgments, even in these "obvious" cases, may be challenged. If so, the
point approaches making. I can show situations a-plenty where my judgment is obviously
wise. But will not my challenger have situations which show his challenge to be wise?
Do we not perhaps need then to discrindinate?
56. One qualification, already suggested, needs repeating here. There are doctrinal
controversies which rest on ideological difference. Of these, there are those which rest
on vital ideological difference, and those which rest on teapot ideological difference.
Whether "acceptance" by mail requires to be received to be "communicated", etc. is
of the latter type. Big-endians and Little-endians may indeed fight and die, and enjoy
it. But law and legal rule are practical tools for practical men, and have as their job
to center on practical issues. And most conflicts of legal doctrine do just that.
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RULES WHICH ARE LEGAL-CONSEQUENCE-VOCABULARY,
AND THEIR USES
The cheapest peace comes via opiate. Doctrine can seem to solve the
problem of reexamination by setting up a pair or more of diverse legal
consequences for use in the problem situation-and let it go at that. At
which point one recalls the requisites of meaningfulness for a rule: it
must signal and sharpen the real issue, and it must give indication to the
judge as to what facts are to fall, to the counsellor indication of what
facts will fall, on either side. Any rule which merely defines a term of
art in terms of legal consequence (rather than in terms of operative fact)
will, be it repeated, remain without significance in life until it is accom-
panied and supplemented by other rules which root it in the soil of fact;
the same holds true of any pair of rules which define two categories
covering a field of fact, but which speak only in terms of diverse legal
consequence; or indeed of any rule which lays down merely that one
legal consequence follows from another. As soon as, and to the extent
to. which, such rules acquire rooting in fact, they become well-nigh in-
dispensable tools for handling a complex legal life; but only then. Thus
the division of proposals-in-fact into those which empower to acceptance
and those which do not is in first instance a matter purely of legal
vocabulary: the one class consists of what produces the legal conse-
quence, acceptability-in-law, the other class consists of what does not;
in Hohfeld's terms, the one does, the other does not, create a power of
acceptance-in-law in an addressee of the language. And acceptance-in-law
cannot well be accurately defined save as "that which makes stick-in-law
such words as legally are capable of being made-in law- to stick,"
accompanied, orthodoxly, by a further rule that in a bilateral deal if the
offeror is thus obligated, so and simultaneously is the acceptor: in reason-
ing (though not in temporal sequence of event) one legal consequence
from another, and thus far without footing in fact.
Even reduced-artificially reduced, if you will-to barest vocabulary,
the division of a field along such lines would represent a juridical advance
over either confusion or conflict of doctrine. For such a division states
that there is a problem of discrimination present within a more or less
defined field of fact: words which may contain a promise-on-condition,
which may be of legal interest and effect. And by providing two cate-
gories of contradictory legal consequence the division challenges to the
making of the needed discrimination. Still, if it does nothing more, it
gives no guidance. Guidance-or misguidance-derives not from mere
division, but from the nature of our language and from the fact that
the great body of our legal terms are not only derived from lay language
but are still used in lay language, and in their impact carry connotations
of lay fact which of necessity somewhat direct their application.
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It is an old story, already referred to, that our case-law has been
peculiarly averse to the coinage of terms which are baldly technical and
which are therefore easy to mark off as terms purely of legal consequence;
that our typical terms are used at once as descriptions of fact and as
indications of legal consequence or of whole bodies of legal consequence;
that rigorous and systematic legal definition is avoided as if by instinctive
perception that it would impair our characteristic case-to-case fluidity of
judgment A continental lawyer gasps when he hears a judge announcing
happily that a conditional "acceptance" (a factual term, purely) is no
"acceptance" (a legal term, purely) or that this "offer" was a "mere
preliminary negotiation". And one cannot ostrich the fact that our
thinking, teaching, deciding and especially opinion-writing would gain
much in clarity and simplicity if it were our practice to use one pure
fact-word for the problematical fact set-up and a different word for the
category-in-issue which is charged with legal consequence. Is this proposal
an Offer? Is this countermand a Revocation? Is this expiration a Lapse?
Is this reply a Rejection or Inquiry or Counter-offer or Cross-offer or
Acceptance? Is this agreement a Contract?
Despite Continental gasping, however, and the teaching value of such
discrete and issue-sharpening terms, the way of our law is what the
way of our law is. Hence it is almost impossible to find pairs of desig-
nation of legal consequence whose names do not willy-nilly tend to point
some issue as the issue; and half the time the terms have come into use
not in what a Continental would conceive as fused and confused groping
with law-and-fact at once, but in sound case-law feeling for the value
of terms which guide decision. Our immediate concern is, however, not
with genesis but with result: for if the terms do turn out ill-adjusted to
difficult purpose, then they either guide little, or guide badly.
As an instance of superb labeling, take penalty and liquidated damages.
A tyro who had never read a case on the point could spot the lines of
the discrimination to be made and wrestle intelligently with a novel state
of fact." Note how strongly the two terms are impregnated with fact-
flavor, the one with punishment, the other with reasonable arrangement
in the circumstances; note how the legal consequence flavor coincides with
the fact-flavor. Note, finally, that the terms are spicy with the why of
57. When our labels with law at one end and fact at the other are like these, they
offer a short cut in action, a saving in discussion, a precision both for adjudication and
for counsellor's prophecy, which makes the more systematic Continental methods look
crude. When our same double-ended labels shoot enough off the target, and the Conti-
nentals stay on their target, then we are the silly-lookers. Here, as in the matter of
Code and Case, or in the matter of Philosophical Implication and Pragmatic Action, or
of Law and Fact, the question is not one between methods, but one of getting out of
any method what it has to give. A question which reminds a little of the problem of
Conflict, just discussed. For excellent discussion, see E. N. Garlan's forthcoming CoN-
TEMPORARY AmEa.cAN REALISTIc JURISPRUDENCE AND THE THE= oF JUsTIcE, c. IlL
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the distinction to be taken, so that novel situations may hope for wise
and moderately predictable integration with the precedented. Contrast
now the terms in use in the Offer and Acceptance region.
A few decades back Offer (which was an invitation to deal) was set
against a Mere Invitation to Deal. Which did not prove peculiarly help-
ful. Today the introduction of "Preliminary Negotiation" helps materially
to point the issue. If for Offer we were now to write "Definitive Offer",
the two terms would talk, almost without cases, as do "Penalty" and
"Liquidated Damages". Have not our rulings suffered, in the interim?
-"Acceptance" and "Rejection" do say their piece; but they have given
us trouble by the suggestion that they exhaust the field of Reply, which
they do not. "Acceptance" and "Conditional Acceptance", coupled with
the queer doctrine that offer and acceptance must match like the halves
of an indenture, draw off attention from the true issue in two directions
at once. The issue is, have the parties, for the parties' purposes, agreed
on what is to the parties a closed deal? Hence, if as in the Phoenix case"
one party requires assurance that the other party really understands and
agrees to observe some condition "implied in law" in the offer, there is
no deal closed in fact until that assurance has been obtained; and to
impose legal obligation is to use a mailed fist on the unsuspecting. Where-
as (turning now not to orthodox doctrine but to misled courts) to read
"conditional acceptance" as meaning "acceptance coupled with a clause",
although the deal is plainly on,"0 is to overlook, in the teeth of horse-
sense, even three good and accepted doctrinal possibilities: (1) The one
most used: the clause is precatory only; (2) the one more frequent in
fact-"I suggest this further arrangement"-a further offer, added to an
initial acceptance; (3) one almost as frequent in fact: "Moreover, I am
willing to do not only the lawyers' say-so on what I must, but what I
think is convenient to you, and probably is what you mean me to."
In sum, the fact that a rule or a pair of rules may amount chiefly to
the fixing of a vocabulary about legal consequence, to a pigeon-holing
system built largely in terms of result, does not deny utility to such rules.
Use they may have, and accurate vocabulary will serve both order in the
law and neatness in problem-posing. But such rules must be seen for
what they are if they are to guide either decision or prediction; in both
58. Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff, 253 Fed. 165 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918), 1 A. L. R.
1508 (1919). In 1 WILLSTON AND THOMPsON, CoNmAcTs (1936) § 78, this matter is
skilfully treated, and on the whole soundly. How that treatment squares with WILLISTON
AND THoMPsON § 77 (which, see its n. 2, is not unaware of occasional need for criticizing
holdings) is beyond this author. There is no consistency in the cases. The judges have
been misled by faulty doctrinal phrasing of issue. There is therefore only one thing
to do: draw the issue cleanly, to its purpose, and divide sheep-holdings from goat-holdings.
For although this may not lead to clarity, no other procedure can offer even a hope.
59. Proposal for sale of stock or even land, "Accepted send stock (or deed) with
draft."
[Vol. 48: 1
OUR CASE-LAW OF CONTRACT
aspects, their significance lies in what indication their language either
gives of itself, or is accompanied by, in complementary rules, as to what
facts fit which of the rival pigeonholes, and why. This needs emphasis
because the classification here contains in itself the result. Precedents are
apposite in terms of their inanner of classifying the raw facts before the
court, and of the rationale of such classification. Hence only when rules
of vocabulary are spotted for what they are can one hope for court and
writer consistently to avoid disposing of precedents upon their artifacts.
--"That" (a case with like raw facts) "was a case where no formal
agreement had been required--as if the manner of determining that very
question were not the inwards of the precedent.,C
In view, moreover, of the tendency of the concept "rule" to suggest
some definiteness and fixity, we shall do well to recall that much useful
charting of travel can be done by way of indicating merely direction,
across a country whose boundaries and even detailed landscape may still
be blind to us. If the lines of proper cleavage be moderately dear, detail
can then be accumulated as we go, and mistaken judgment on detail (as
in the case of principle) can then be left behind. But for a rule or con-
cept to take more definite shape, or to expand, intelligently and intelligibly,
the core of purpose must be clear-and must be just to the situation.
Out of the root of this purpose-line of significance, the other-that of
what facts call the rule into application-can be left to grow and change;
this, as I understand it, is what is being said by those who urge that
case-law depends on Principle.
THE MAGIC OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
Even case-law judges persist in an urge to shape results to the life-
situation as they see it. Through open confusion and conflict runs their
desire to find a doctrinal definition of any situation which is just to that
situation in life. Through the covert confusion of result typically attend-
ant on accepted doctrine which either is at odds with life or is non-
significant, runs the same urge and sap, unevenly and unpredictably choked
back by some doctrinal block, or else bursting through. No large-scale
doctrinal dichotomy, then, which too much misfits life can hope to fit
the cases; the more outlandish the one misfit, the more probable and
pervasive the other.
60. One of the goals of rule-maklng is to find external indicia which both clearly
and without undue hardship on the uninitiate guide the application of such rules. Contrast
the effective advance indications afforded by color of paper and heading, as between
bills of lading, with the gropings in the field of the Statute of Frauds and of the Parol
Evidence Rule, as printings are confused xith individuated writings, or probable deals
with doubtful ones.
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The great dichotomy in the orthodox doctrine of Offer and Acceptance
is that between bilateral and unilateral contract.0 ' But there have been
signs over thirty years or more of difficulty with it and its implications.
Perhaps it is time to recanvass the life-situation with which it has to deal.
And so to recanvass the cases which its office is to reflect and to guide.
This will not be easy doing. The rules of Offer and Acceptance have
been worked over; they have been written over; they have been shaped
and rubbed smooth with pumice, they wear the rich deep polish of a
thousand class rooms; they have a grip on the vision and indeed on the
affections held by no other rules "of law," real or pseudo. For it was
Offer and Acceptance which first led each of us out of laydom into The
Law. Puzzled, befogged, adrift in the strange words and technique of
cases, with only our sane feeling of what was decent for a compass, we
felt the warm sun suddenly, we knew that we were arriving, we knew
we too could "think like a lawyer": That was when we learned to down
seasickness as A revoked when B was almost up the flag-pole. Within
the first October, we had achieved a technical glee in justifying judgment
then for A; and succulent memory lingers, of the way our dumber
brethren were pilloried as Laymen still. This is therefore no area of
"rules" to be disturbed. It is an area where we want no disturbance,
and will brook none. It is the Rabbit-Hole down which we fell into the
Law, and to him who has gone down it, no queer phenomenon is strange;
he has been magicked; the logic of Wonderland we then entered makes
mere discrepant decision negligible. And it is not only hard, it is ob-
noxious, for any of us who have gone through that experience to even
conceive of Offer and Acceptance as perhaps in need of re-examination,
I, too, am of the generation to whom Offer and Acceptance in tradi-
tional garb were as the rising of the sun. It had always been; it would
always be; and it somehow was good. And the Law said, "Let there be
Promise for a Promise or Promise for an Act." And that binds eyes as
ancient China did a little lady's feet. Our generation will not easily regain
a normal vision. But it does help a little to realize that it was not really
so in the beginning. Story's remarks on Offer and Acceptance were
largely not law when written in 1844, and still are not. Parsons, in 1853,
attempted to open the subject on the cases; but Langdell could not stomach
Parsons' views. Nor are they what we have learned. The analysis which
to all of us has been as if eternal, with its neatly boxed "Did A want
a promise or an act?", its straight-line rigid consequences, its integration
61. The argument is that the classical bilateral-unilateral distinction dies as it ap-
proaches fact either of life or of case decision. I put forward as a major piece of evi-
dence the prominence which that distinction has in the table of contents of 1 WVuiwsroN
AD THOmpSON, op. cit. supra note 58, and the lack of correspondence of the text, and
much more of the notes, to the suggestions in the table of contents. The RESTAT-AIENT
shows the distinction only in the background, coloring much, but not explicitly, as a
fundamental cleavage.
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into an equally neat theory of consideration, that analysis appears in print
first less than seventy years ago. A good part of the cases we still study
antedate it-and their decisions are far from squaring with it, especially
with its class-room implications.
ACCEPTANCE
In the melodrama of the first year class room, and its aftermath,
Acceptance is the villain of the piece, double-dealing at every step, and
masking it all beneath the neatly barbered black moustache of a single
word that comes by stealth upon the stage only after the "Nature of
the Offer" has set traps at every step for any unsuspecting honest man.
"Acceptance" is a single word, but it is a word at once of meaning in
fact (roughly: "agreeing") and meaning in law (roughly: "what makes
an Offer stick."). That might seem bad enough, but it is the kind of am-
biguity our law is familiar with and is moderately competent to handle
without much thought. The trouble lies elsewhere. The trouble lies in
that Acceptance is in addition, as it shuttles and shifts between the uni-
lateral and the bilateral situations, a term with radically divergent legal
connotations in the two; and with radically divergent factual implications
in the two. This portends trouble. It produces it. It is the kind of am-
biguity which no law is competent to handle without very careful thought.
For observe:
Acceptance in the bilateral, on the side of legal consequence, means in
first instance the barring of an offeror from getting out on his own motion
before he has received an iota of the ultimate substance of his bargain.
It means a legal effect which calls into play the whole law of conditions
and breach. But in the unilateral situation orthodox doctrine takes this
same term and uses it to mean the obligating of an offeror only after
he has received the uttermost jot of everything bargained for; in orthodox
doctrine about unilateral-formation, acceptance is a term whose use
excludes from operation (before or after acceptance) the law of con-
structive conditions and of their fulfillment; the theory being that an
offeror "is master of his offer"; the theory being that there must be "a
contract" before such concepts as substantial performance can have rele-
vance. In the bilateral, "Acceptance" carries no implication that suit by
the acceptor will ever lie; in the orthodox unilateral theory, "Acceptance"
means that only Providence can save the offeror. Two concepts; one
label. Now the dominant pattern of thought is set by the bilateral situ-
ation, it is the usual situation, it is the normal one, it gives the word-
on the legal side--its tone. The pattern of thought is: such notions as
substantiality or partial compliance have no relevance to Acceptance;
nothing but the whole of what is asked for is enough; which is a sane
enough idea when the whole of what is supposed to be asked for consists
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in the uttering of words. Ergo nothing but the whole of "what is asked
for" will bar the offeror from getting out on his own motion. Transfer
this attitude and reasoning bodily to the unilateral situation, and "prin-
ciple" rises up to struggle with sense.
For on the fact-side, too, in regard to what facts will "constitute an
acceptance," i.e., be facts with whatever result is connoted by that term,
the deep and abiding flavor of the word in our thought and in our
language derives no less from the bilateral situation. The picture the
word calls up is that of agreeing, and the agreeing dominantly pictured
is agreeing by words of agreement; the doctrines on rejection, revocation,
counteroffer, conditional acceptance, and acceptance itself are doctrines
whose timbers are cases construing correspondence; where letter or tele-
gram can be matched at leisure against telegram or letter. The necessary
result has been to pepper the word, on the side of the facts to be classi-
fied as constituting an Acceptance, with this idea of expressed agreement
as being a necessary element. Hence, even in a situation in which the
word "agreement" or "assent" is factually all but meaningless or
entirely so, the talk will be of agreement or assent: so in the reward cases.
Knowledge of an offered reward and intent to earn a reward are con-
cepts with body to them; but assent to an offer of reward-expressed
"assent", where words of agreement will be nugatory-is a wraith or
scholar's nightmare. The observation goes further: when faced by the
reliance cases, orthodox doctrine first denied them, then attempted to
remove them from the field of Acceptance entirely, thereby shutting out
their beautiful illumination of the unilateral situation. 2 Of this, more
hereinafter; of immediate concern is that the picture of agreement in
words, dominated in its turn by the matching of correspondence, so
easily and imperceptibly leads into the idea of exact agreement that we
have even come to seek a rationale for that requirement: "Of course the
offeror can completely control the terms of his offer." The next step
again follows, to the same result-not inevitably, but almost so: "No
Acceptance [in law] can occur until the offeror has received all that he
asked for." The stage is now set for the double meaning and the double
dealing: "all that he asked for," built in a bilateral background to mean
62. Without attempting here to anticipate the detail of a later paper, it may yet
be suggested that a number of scholars who use tort-law as a basis for judging the proper
effect of revoking an offer for a unilateral, or of negligently inducing belief that there
has been a promise, have nonetheless accepted as of course, but without drawing the
inferences, ethical and legal justifications for hog-tieing any man who knowingly utters
"I accept." My own guess is that wisdom lies in binding such a person to his utterance,
and that the place of tort analogy in contract law lies elsewhere than in the law of
agreement. Certainly it is important that unilateral-contract ideology should not be
allowed to drown out the utter immateriality of reliance-detriment when promises are
clear and decent oft both sides. Not so much in reliance as in decent promise then decent-
ly enforced lies the essential base-line and the line of growth. There simply is more to
promise than there is to tort.
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"all the promises he asked for, without an iota of performance," will be
used in the unilateral situation to mean "the whole of the expected stuff
itself." As if they were the same.P
Given this unnoticed use of the single word in multiguity, the nature
of man's mind requires that the flavor which the word acceptance draws
from the factually dominant and heavily documented bilateral situation
on the side both of law and of fact should combine to drive orthodox
theory into exacting utter completion of the bargained-for performance
before the offeror's unilateral promise may stick. Dramatically, then, and
beguilingly, the promise is stated to be offered for "an act"-a simple
unit, a single-stroke thing happening as does a promise in one instant-
and the startling double-shift of meaning drops from sight.
Persisting difficulty with the acceptance concept has continued to mani-
fest itself in the very process of reforming doctrine. Thus to Corbin,
anent the bilateral, "acceptance" was that act of an offeree which exer-
cised the power conferred by the offeror. And with what legal effect?
I can find one only: it bars the offeror's later revocation (and so, normally
and with due qualification, the promising offeree's.) Yet when the uni-
lateral situation moves into discussion, even Corbin's own incisive and
effective argtument for recognition that the offer may become irrevocable
before all the bargained-for ccinditions have been performed (which for
his bilateral would have meant to him "acceptance") was coupled with
the repeated pronouncement that of course there is no "acceptance" and
"no contract" until such full performance.Y4 Pollock had earlier seen the
point, as he pondered the "pure" unilateral theory put forward by Ashley
in its rigor: "The offer is irrevocably accepted by the first unequivocal
commencement of the act."05 There is more to be said about whether this
is law, unqualified; and about the phrase "the act"; but Pollock's use
of "accept" is clearly at one with our usage in the bilateral situation. From
which one might reason that respectability does not demand confusion.O
63. The duplicity of Acceptance is commonly masked in discussion by beginning
with Offer. Now out of Offer, as out of a major premise or a magician's high hat,
anything can be taken which is first put in. Yet the cases signal trouble for inadequate
theoretical analysis: "The practical approach of the modem law has engrafted an im-
portant exception upon the fundamental rule that, since the offeror is master of his
offer, its terms must be strictly complied with." 1 WmILisTo., AD Tnomrso:-, op. cit.
supra note 29, § 78 A. The section has to do with performance as being effective, where
the offer is conceived as calling for a promise. When an "exception" is practical, im-
portant, modem, and conceded law, it may be time to consider whether the "principle"
has any of these attributes.
64. See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (1917) 26 YxLE L. J. 169.
65. Pollock, Book Review (1912) 28 L. Q. REv. 100.
66. Yet respectability does urge toward confusion. Faced wvith the one situation in
which promise for promise, bald, really meant something (insurance not voided by the
insured's failure to perform his "independent" promise to pay the premium) so shrewd
and skilful a scholar as Patterson thought wise to follow Harriman in arguing that this
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The truth of the matter is that out of the decisions a relatively clear
and homogeneous doctrine of offer and acceptance can be built to cover
the initiation of business deals and can include a fair number of cases
which now escape the rubric; I even suspect that the lines of needed
adaptation to hold the non-business phases of the family cases and the
readjustment aspects of a going business relation will prove neither
over-difficult to find nor over-complex to follow. But the effort to develop
such doctrine will involve temporary and tentative discard of certain
orthodoxish axioms. The initiation of business deals will be treated as
a homogeneous core of material for discussion. Mutual assent will be
tentatively regarded not as a legal requisite for contractual obligation but
as a fact which commonly leads thereto, and commonly is found where
contractual obligation is. But, not being a "legal requisite," it will be
treated as present only where it is present in fact and not by courteous
fiction. Above all, that great dichotomy of the first year class-room, the
division of Contract into two major categories of formation, the bilateral
and the pure "unilateral", will be subjected to rather stubbornly skeptical
scrutiny. The suspicion is that that dichotomy represents doctrine divorced
from life, and therefore does not comfortably hold the cases, and there-
fore is misleading; and that it spawns unnecessary difficulties. To be
sure, no line of analysis can properly be said to be wrong, merely because
it divides mankind, say, into such a dichotomy as those who are bearded
ladies and those who are not. But such a line of analysis does suggest
the presence of more bearded ladies than there are, which tends to mis-
lead. And it raises questions as to just who is a bearded lady, and what
the consequences are of being one, which may be fascinating and certainly
offer dramatic teaching possibilities, but which still are hardly the most
useful training material to be had for a crowded curriculum, Finally, the
learning on the subject, when achieved, is almost sure to be cast in terms
which obscure more practical distinctions such as those of nationality
or sex. Enough of illustrative comment: the hypothesis of this paper is
that unilaterals, at large, for purposes of studying formation, are not
usefully conceived as one of two coordinate bodies of Contracts cases;
that the classical class-room pure unilateral, in particular, is not an im-
portant type on which an innocent law student's teeth should be cut to
the eternal misshaping of his view of Contract, but belongs in the freak-
tent as an interesting and often instructive curiosity.
for once classically pure bilateral was in essence unilateral I The Delivery of a Life
Insurance Policy, supra note 32, at 199.
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